Introduction
The politics of the State of Säo Paulo have been dominated after the onset of the republican regime by that most famous party known as the PRP (Partido Republicano Paulista). Much has been written about the perrepista predominance in paulista politics and economy and about the specific PRP contribution to the fashioning of certain aspects of the federal system in Brazil during the first republican period. Less, however, has been written about the social, cultural, educational and juridical weight of the different power groups represented in the PRP which, banded together, have ruled Sâo Paulo between 1889 and 1930 and which -with some changes in the outlook and some concessions to the modernization of political techniques -have continued to have a voice in paulista political life (the visible one as well as the invisible one) well after the revolution of 1930.
While this is not the best context for dealing with the evolution and the paramountcy of this party in Sâo Paulo and in Brazil, a cursory exposition of the main reasons for its strength will give -we assume -a more comprehensive background to the present topic.
The PRP was the most important fraction in an otherwise loosely-knit republican movement-weak itself -in imperial Brazil, and remained the most important, albeit under different conditions of power and government, also after the proclamation of the republican regime, in 1889.
A complex of interests -economic and cultural mostly -sprung historically from the changes produced in Sâo Paulo by the introduction of free labor in the late sixties of the XlXth century, the republican movement evolved slowly and acquired its first ideological rationalisation quite late, in the somewhat hazy and prolix Manifesto Republicano of Itú(1873). Subsequently, its intellectual stalwarts got entangled in a secret society operating in the elite circles of Säo Paulo -centered generally on the Faculty of Law of this city -the Burschenschaft (or the Burcha), still a legend and still a riddle of paulista history of yore, unsatisfactorily solved until this very day.
The PRP's organizational blue-print did not correspond to a conventional pyramid -distribution of duties and tasks, nor to the parallel ascension of the party -members in rank and hierarchy. As a rule, the Party was a cttpu-la without any organized membership, its public activities being confined to annual conventions, occasional speeches in political clubs, and so on. This cupula, in turn comprised at all times a more or less fixed proportion of coffee-planters, well-off merchants and bankers, senior civil servants of the state administration (including magistrates), some Faculty professors (mostly of Law), seconded by an intermediate group of lesser employers, journalists and students, almost in this order. (After 1915, some new industrialists joined the Party, generally as less important members.)
The Party was present in two parallel political spheres: one, the official life of Säo Paulo, was characterized by the election -generally by fraud or intimidation or sheer corruption -of selected people destined to act in the name of the Party as the unique representatives of the "general will": as city councillors (vereadores), as district chiefs, as members of the State Legislative Assembly, as Governors or members of Sâo Paulo State Government, or as deputies or senators for Säo Paulo in the federal Congress. This official sphere included also indication, before official appointment, of State magistrates, of commanding officers of the State gendarmerie (Força públi-ca) as well as of important educational officers (especially the Deans of the schools of higher learning). All these appointments were made through the official state machinery, governed in turn by a State Constitution, formulated in 1891 by famous paulista jurists, members of the PRP.
The non-official sphere was marked by the persistence, over a forty-yearspan of exclusive leadership, of a number of families generally related one to another, sharing among themselves the leadership of the Party and, conceivably enough, also the major spoils of the power (political, economic, cultural endeavors and jobs and financial credits among other things). Lesser jouisseurs du pouvoir would receive corresponding benefits: remunerative registrar offices (cartórios or tabeliôes) which permitted quite a comfortable living, stipends for sons, exemptions from military service, and so on.
The same applied in commerce, where the Associaçâo Commercial de Säo Paulo had the upper hand, its leaders being appointed upon previous agreement of the PRP and chosen from the elite families in power. This would, conversely, ensure a certain trend in the investment policies and, consequently, in the development -as a rule plantation-wise -of the State of Säo Paulo.
Academic life did not fare better. Student activités, to begin with, were in the hands of the PRP through party proxies, placed at the helm of the student organizations, based upon the schools of higher learning of the State. Most renowned of all was the Centro Onze de Agósto -founded in 1903 -whose leaders were chosen among the scions of well-to-do families, through the dual play of the PRP and the Burcha, powerful among the professors of the Faculty of Law. The Centro Onze de Agósto also served as a nursery for future party-leaders at the highest level. The PRP was also in control of student publications, through an open policy of supplying paper and money for their publication.
The professors' ranks were controled through the same system, ensuring obedience to the Party of the faculty Congregaçôes (faculty assemblies of professors). What with the Dean appointed and dismissed by the State Government (in the case of the Faculty of Law which was federal, the appointment was reserved to PRP "recommendation") , and what with the career assured by party connections and good will and what with the Faculties' publications controled also through the same policy of supplying money and printing paper, the pressure exerted over the teaching staffs was evident and, as a rule, accepted as a natural thing; indeed, many a professor or a young lecturer (lente) was encouraged and would accept to climb the ladder to obtain professional jobs or posts of senators or deputies, and so on.
Academic life gave the PRP an intellectual brilliancy which was an axiomatic feature in Sâo Paulo while in turn the party would ensure the faculties, up-grading and respected positions in public life.
Controling the most developed regional economy of Brazil, having also the largest State representation in the Congress, the PRP dominated at will the public life of Sâo Paulo and, in many ways, that of Brazil as well.
Its paramountcy was also facilitated by the small participation of the population at large to the public affairs, a fact fundamentally assured by the exclusion by the Brazilian Constitution of 1891 of the illiterates -the majority of the people in Brazil -from any political process. Thus, the PRP reigned uncontested really at home, never defeated.
A staunch promoter of economic liberalism and of political conservatism, the PRP did not prevent the expansion of cultural movements within the Sao Paulo elites and, in many a way, it was also the requested patron of many attempts at facilitating the penetration of Western cultural patterns of life and ideas in Sâo Paulo. But, conceivably enough, it was at the same time a tough adversary ol State interference in economy and in labor relations and viewed with disfavor marxism, anarcho-syndicalism and unionism, and did its outmost to curb, even by physical repressive means, their dissemination throughout this State.
This did not prevent an intellectual "curiosity" for such exotic movements to spread within the academic circles of Sâo Paulo as well as in the newspapers and other cultural publications of the time. The existence of a newspaper the like of "O Estado de Sâo Paulo" (running parallel to the party official organ, the "Correio Paulistano") permitted the emergence in time of a small protest engouement characterizing the political thinking of many a professor or a student or a journalist, otherwise remote from the plight of the common man. Some of the paulista intellectuals felt also the impact of the modernist trends of rerum novarum and thus, quite before the outbreak of the war in Europe, a small reformistic sector appeared, hesitantly, on the horizon of an otherwise placid and conformist intellectual life, contributing to maintain a limited dose of dissatisfaction with the social, moral and juridical situation of the State.
However, it was much later, not until 1926, that a strong-willed intellectual oppositionist group, already conditioned by the previous years of mild criticism, decided to break away and constitute the first oppositionist party in the State, the Partido Democràtico de Säo Paulo which demanded the extension of electoral franchise to all, party plurality and so on. This party was to be, for the next four years, one of the main architects of the downfall of the first Brazilian Republic 1 .
1) There is no single work dealing exclusively with the PRP role in paulista or Brazilian politics either in Portuguese or in other languages. The book of C. Α. Β o hter: From Monarchy to Republic (Portuguese version: Da Monarquía à República. Rio de Janeiro 1954), deals only with the emergence of this party at the end of the Empire and with the take-over after the 15th of November, 1889. On the other hand, as is known, the archives of the PRP were destroyed during the liberal revolution of 1930. However, much material on this party's modus operandi can be found in the rich political literature dealing with the first Republic. This is not the time to start its enumeration, which would extend over several pages. .. Herewith, we present -without any pretending to exhaust the secondary literature on PRP's participation in Brazilian history -a small selection of works in Portuguese, being aware that we have left out many a valuable contemporary testimony on the topic. As for the foreign literature on this subject, we assume that the specialized reader is conversant with the interpreters of Brazilian general history (Eric Baklanoff, John W. What follows is an attempt at focusing the interest on the radicalization of the political thought in Sao Paulo at the time under review, upon the emergence in this State of the first organized contesting group within the PRP, which advocated the moralization of the political mores, the extension of the political expression of the population, and the acculturation, i.e., the politization of the common man, in order to obtain more social solidarity in a multi-ethnic and class-conscious surrounding.
This organization, the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo, has quite an interesting story, which the present article endeavors to give from a specific angle, related basically to the manner in which grass-roots democracy was being conceived by rebellious intellectuals and proposed to be debated in oligarchical Säo Paulo of yore.
As the XXth century began, a small intellectual group appeared within the perrepista establishment, which tried to popularize -as it were -some reformistic ideas on the participation of the "people" at large in the electoral and other political processes of the time. Led by journalist Júlio Mesquita, co-owner of the "Estado de Säo Paulo", it soon came to be known as the Dissidéncia. It benefited largely from the participation of some of the leading figures in paulista intellectual life of those times, most conspicuous among them being several professors at the Sao Paulo Faculty 2) The Manifesto of the first "dissidents" within the PRP was published on the 6th of November 1901 in the "Estado de S5o Paulo". It accused the ruling group of having deviated from the original "beliefs and traditions" of the party. (See also Edgard As a rule, the Dissidéncia advocated better education at the primary level for the marginal sectors of the urban population and, on a civic plane, the recuperation of illiterate adults; it also showed preoccupation with the low performances of the electoral processes of the time and with the growing abstentionism among the electorate -in itself a small sector of the population. It also asked the authorities to show more sensitivity to the social tensions prevalent at that time in the city and the State of Sâo Paulo. On a national institutional plane, however, its members were staunch defenders of paulista regionalism and, despite their inclination to see civic education on a Brazilian-wide perspective, they demonstrated a lack of understanding and even haughtiness vis-à-vis the idea of extended, national compulsory military service.
After several years of internal bickering, the Dissidéncia gave vent, in 1911, to a very strong reformistic mood in the columns of the "Estado de Sâo Paulo", on the occasion of the public Inquiry held by the newspaper that year as to the best means to assure a decent and faithful election of the highest executive officers in the State and in the Union. Most of the intellectual stalwarts of this pressure group came out on this occasion strongly in favour of extended popular participation in elections, as a means of ameliorating the relations between elite and common people 3 .
The ideas of the "dissidents" were influenced -with different emphasis -by the wave of modernization spreading over Brazilian urban life at the turn of the century 4 as well as by the radicalism in ascension in neighboring Argentina. Soon, the provisions of the famous Argentinian "Ley Sáenz-Pefta" would, after 1912, be strongly advanced by the "dissidents" and used in order to propagate the necessity for Brazil's putting in practice really universal secret suffrage, besides the necessity of finding means to definitely eradicate illiteracy and consequent apathy in large layers of the population 5 .
Ca 5 ) The Argentinian electoral model is proposed for the first time in a book written by a young Brazilian lieutenant (a former military attaché in Buenos Aires) Genserico de Vasconcellos: A argentina militar e naval, Rio de Janeiro 1915. This book reflected also the reformist discussion underway in Brazil since the beginning of the One can safely assume that the "dissidents" within the PRP would not contemplate any dramatic break with the entrenched party-oligarchy and, reformist as they pretended to be, would accept -in a rather disciplined way -the basic rules of behaviour dictated by the party leaders 6 .
The Dissidéncia fell slowly into disuse during the Hermes da Fonseca presidency, probably under the impact of the salvaçôes which asked for more unity among the groups forming the ruling elite in Sâo Paulo 7 .
Anyhow, it was among the sympathizers of this group that the nationalistic propaganda of the war years found its most attentive listeners and supporters and, it was among its former members that Olavo Bilac, the poet directing at that time the nationalist campaign of the Liga de Defesa Nacional would find his most useful and impassionated associates, in his endeavors to create in Sao Paulo a regional, civic-minded framework of activities for the paulista academic youth.
This regional framework -which came to be known after 1917 as the Liga Nacionalista de Sâo Paulo -represents in our opinion the necessary intermediate link between the raw reformism of the Dissidéncia and the ulterior, openly oppositionist groups which emerged in the paulista setting after 1925, the Partido da Mocidade We start this survey with the basic idea that nobody has thoroughly analysed until now the ideas and the activities of the Liga Nacionalista de Sao Paulo and the reasons why remain, of course, with the political historians of Brazil. Otherwise, its name is frequently quoted by everybody engaged in Brazilian general history or in regional paulista events but always en passant.
What follows is a first attempt at establishing the role played by the Liga Nacionalista de Sao Paulo during its eight years of activities in the paulista intellectual milieu and the place it succeeded to cut for itself, especially in the academic circles of the time. The war in Europe had impressed the Brazilian intellectual world from a civic-cultural point of view as well; it helped demonstrate -especially during the first two years of the conflagration -the value and the strength of nationalist education in schools, in the Press and in the military barracks of the then belligerent countries.
As a rule, those countries where civic consciousness had been previously most evident, France and Belgium and, in a way, Serbia, were also the most resistant to occupation and to attempts at promoting collaboration with the conquerors. The very success of the resistance to the aggressors was considered by many in Brazil as a proof of the justice of those who, in pre-war times, had advocated in Western Europe the necessity of a rapprochement between the elite and the common people at large.
In Brazil, such ideas were advanced and circulated, albeit piecemeal, as far back as 1911, probably under the influence of the salvaçôes, which attempted at that time to break as much as possible both the base and the social-political liens of the so-called oligarquías estaduais 9 . But, at the same time, foreign influences were also felt, echoing the disputes in contemporary France, on the relationship between such basic social frameworks of reference as: the People, the Government, the Armed Forces, Education, the Political Parties, the Press and the Church 10 .
Most affected by such ideas were the Brazilian military who had long since felt their own limitations when discussing problems of national unity ; many an officer would, at the time, come forward with ideas on the popularization of the military service -taken as the one educational means more apt to awaken civic consciousness in the masses and, what was most important, with ideas on the best means to cancel the social barriers between different categories of recruits; such ideas reflected their ambitions to create 9 ) The salvaçôes are considered sometimes as "a barbarous democratization of power", meant to destroy what was "the juridical-constitutional order which, albeit artificial for a country like ours, was and still remains the only dyke opposing the growing tides". A renovated Brazilian army would -in the nationalistic thinking of the Liga de Defesa National's leaders 14 -also imply the renovation of the systems of recruitment as well as, basically, a new approach to the problems of illiteracy and abandonment which characterized at the time the lot of the Brazilian common recruit, taken as a sorry symbol of the Brazilian common man.
Certainly, a new army would have been dependent, first and foremost, on a new, overall educational approach and, by inference, on a new definition of the place of average Brazilians in the current political process. This was present in the preoccupations of the leaders of the Liga de Defesa Nacional, and their endeavors to bring home -especially in the intellectual circles -what they considered as an axiomatic tenet, the idea that a good society reflects itself in a good army, helped start and gave an incentive to much polemics and soul-searching as to the elite's role in shaping a decent Brazilian society.
At the same time, the leaders of the Liga de Defesa Nacional were conscious that -intellectual discourse aside -some practical spade-work must needs be done in order to propagandize both the general idea of a rapprochement between elite and "people" and the idea of democratizing the armed forces and injecting in them "new blood" 15 .
One of the main targets of this incipient civic agitation was the Brazilian student, at that time a typical spoiled scion of well-off sectors of the society and an apathetic individual as far as social solidarity was concerned 16 .
The choice of the Faculty of Law of Säo Paulo for Olavo Bilac's first appearance in the name of the Liga de Defesa National in front of students and professors of higher studies, showed not only good organizational planning but also a sound propagandists approach. Indeed, Sâo Paulowith its comfortably-living elite, with its economy already plunging into the first phase of industrial expansion, with its incipient working-class, with its 14) The Liga de Defesa Nacional appeared in Rio de Janeiro at the end of 1915 as an elitist movement as well. It was led by Olavo Bilac, Miguel Calmon and Pedro Lessa, the latter a most famous jurist of the time. It enjoyed the blessing of President Wenceslau Brás and of the army chiefs, especially the War Minister, Gen. Caetano da Faria, referred to above. It also enjoyed the support of many professors and students of the Rio de Janeiro superior schools.
15) We deal with the civic propaganda of this League in our essay: The Brazilian Version of the National Defence and of the Nation in Arms, in the book mentioned in note no. 11. 1β ) Student political apathy and lack of social solidarity with non-elitist scctors are described and interpreted in oui a.m. Dissertation, Second Part, chapter II: "L'Etudiant dans la société traditionnelle" (pp. 145-178).
diversified rural population, with its large immigrant sectors, but also with its specific psychological isolationism -was apt to present more nuanced reactions to the nationalist propaganda of the new League than, say, the Rio de Janeiro area where social strata were more polarized, also more static and deprived of the sense of mobility which characterized their paulista counterparts.
The appearance of the Liga de Defesa Nacional in Sao Paulo was also facilitated in great measure by the relatively quiet division of opinions (quiet in the sense of not reaching an open rift or even political split) reigning at the time in the leadership of the PRP, as to the meaning of the war and of its repercussions on Brazil 17 . This division of opinions -reflecting also an incipient clivage of economic and cultural interests 18 -was determinated, in turn, by a number of specific phenomena, paulista rather than national, which were affecting the overall evolution of this State and its overwhelming weight in national politics: the rapid introduction of most immigrants in the active life of the State, a growing process of urbanization, a reorganization of rural property, a higher degree of alphabetization and subsequent politization in the urban population 19 and, on the economic plane, a more solid assessment of petit-bourgeois entrepreneurial ventures interested in having access to financial credit until then reserved mostly for traditional vested interests. Inasmuch as these changes were aired in public, they were represented and interpreted by the "Estado de Säo Paulo", whose owner and Director had been -as said before -the chief founder of the reformistminded Dissidéncia. It was the "Estado de Säo Paulo", representing also a combination of reformist clans of the paulista elite 20 , which facilitated Olavo Bilac's appearance at the Faculty of Law of Sao Paulo on the 9th of October 1915. His discourse -which both in pathos and sentiment and in criticism of current opportunism in politics and of social institutions can be compared with the speech given by Rui Barbosa in the same setting in 1909 21 -referred to the abandonment of interest in public affairs on the part of educated youth and to the demoralizing effect this demise had upon the quality of the political life in Brazil; it stressed also the necessity of creating a "nation-in-arms", which would draw its inspiration from compulsory primary education as well as from a better airing and rotation of recruits in the future, renovated Brazilian armed forces 22 . Soon after the speech Bilac, who was an intimate friend of the Mesquita family, persuaded young Julio de Mesquita Filho, the elder son of Júlio Mesquita and himself a student at the Faculty of Law of Sâo Paulo, to try to arrive at some regrouping of the paulista students within a specific regional framework of activities which would henceforth bear the name of Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo. In a letter dated the 25th of October that year, Bilac asked Julio de Mesquita Filho to see to it that "the Leagus should publish a manifesto, brief and concise, [directed] to the students of all Faculties and high-schools of all the [Brazilian] States", which would emphasize the need for youth cooperation with reformist-minded elders, with a view to the "regeneration" of Brazilian social and public life. Bilac also informed his young correspondent that the Ministry of Internal Affairs had already been approached by the Liga de Defesa Nacional to supply a complete list of all the institutions of secondary and higher learning of the country to establish a first contact with such establishments 23 .
While the Liga de Defesa Nacional itself would not elaborate its official program of activities until a year later 24 , Bilac saw to it that its basic tenets should already be advertized in several academic centers of the time (Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Pòrto Alegre), in the Press as well as in 21 His ideas, to be embodied one year later in the Statutes of the League touched: better communication -moral and material^ between the States of the Federation (point a of the Statutes), popular and professional education (b), physical and civic education (c), defense of national labor (d), combat of illiteracy and dissolution of mores (e), patriotic batallions (f), extension of military service (g) and so on. He would also ask for an increased activity towards "brazilianization" of the immigrants through the imposition of the Portuguese language in their midst (point m) 26 .
Student publications and student associations were most responsive to this kind of appeal, which permitted the contemporary educated youth to escape, in a way, the moulds of indifference in which several student generations had been living since the turn of the century, with adverse effects upon public opinion and their own position in society 27 .
In Säo Paulo -the official student "cradle" of the Liga de Defesa Nacional -the student Center at the Faculty of Law was already at work, sponsoring the nationalist theses of Bilac. In May 1916, the organ of this "Center", "0 Onze de Agosto", wrote to the effect that: "... a people that is losing step by step, under the influence of anarchistic principles, the respect for tradition, for national glories, is like a pauperized, anaemic organism in the veins of which runs an impure blood . . ." The Article was trying to strengthen -much along the ideas already aired in Europe by Marinettithe thesis that .. only those [nations] which will remain strong will survive" 28 .
In order to combat what the student review considered "decadence of the national character" and "the wave of scepticism" and promote the "love for tradition", "a pleiad of young paulista men showed itself decided to fulfil the ideas of Bilac, which are those of all the Brazilians" 29 .
Later on, as the Liga de Defesa Nacional got itself formally constituted and issued its Statutes, many student organizations would use Bilac's dis- ) Student participation at the events subsequent to the proclamation of the Republic was limited to militia service during the rebellion of the Naval Squadron (1893-1894), to partiotic demonstrations against the Italian colonias in Brazil (1896 -Questuo dos Protocolos), to protest against the cruci repression of the Canudos insurgents (Bahia 1897). Otherwise, student activism in the pre-1916 period was usually limited to public manifestations of support for the ruling republican parties in the respective States, in exchange for the favors and facilities alluded-to above (note 27). Weak student attempts to reorganize date as of 1900, when a small Federaçâo dos Estudantes Brazileiros (mostly in Law) was constituted in Rio dc Janeiro, an event followed much later, in 1909, by another generation's participation in the first Congress of Brazilian students (again, in Law) in Rio de Janeiro. This Congress witnessed also the first timid attempts at criticizing the state of the Brazilian society. 31 ) A memoir, written later on by one of the former members of this "nationalist" group, cited the following sons of well to-do paulista families as pertaining to the new trend: Clóvis Ribeiro, Sarti Prado, Julio Mesquita Filho, Francisco Mesquita (his brother), Francisco Barros Pentcado Filho, Thomaz Lessa, Vicente Ancona, Waldomiro Vergueiro, Francisco Alves Filho, Affonso Paes de Barros, Joäo Alberto Salles, José Alves dc Cerquira César Netto, Arnaldo Vieira de Carvalho Filho, Antonio Pereira Lima, Cid Castro Prado, Abelardo Vergueiro César (cf.: Abelardo Vergueiro César: "Centro Académico XI de Agosto", first published as an article in the Revista Nacional of SSo Paulo, in 1929; found by this author as a typed memoir, written later on 17. 7. 1933, for Júlio de Mesquita Filho, then Director of the "Estado de Säo Paulo").
32 ) Antonio Pereira Lima: "Discurso proferido na Festa da Chave, em 2 de Dezembro de 1916", in: Onze de Agosto, numero especial para hachareis, NovembroDczcmbro de 1916, pp. 181-182. The Festa da Chave was an annual ceremony held by the Faculty of Law of SSo Paulo: the outgoing graduates would had-over a symbolic key to the students entering their last year. We believe that it was also the sole, oncc-aycar public manifestation of patronage on the part of the Burcha, otherwise keeping its activities under rigorous sccrccy. ice, etc., reminding his fellow students that electoral abstention was one of the biggest evils in Brazil 33 . He showed himself convinced that "our old Faculty should -and would -lead this campaign" 34 .
The professors' part was rather strong in this awakening of civic consciousness among the students of Säo Paulo. However, their attitude -like that of the students -was not even or clearly directed towards the implementation of Olavo Bilac's "good news". For some of them -those still influenced by the paternalistic mood expressed in the 1911 Inquiry of the "Estado de Säo Paulo" -the introduction of the proletariat and other still lesser sectors of the population in the political circuit was a difficult thing to conceive. Instead, they would cling to the idea that maybe the army barracks would suffice both to awaken the dormant Brazilian man and to instill in him discipline, reverence and awe for the already existing social system. They would also look to the students to participate in military service, seeing in it a good way of having them unterstand the mentality of the common people 3 s .
One of the most vocal professors at the Faculty of Law of Sâo Paulo, and himself a member of the newly-formed Liga de Defesa Nacional, was Frederico Vergueiro Steidel who, on the same occasion of the Festa da Chave (mentioned above) exhorted the students to dedicate themselves:
.. to new ideas of the National Defense" and "to spread . . . public instruction by word and by pen, to criticize the errors committed and to indicate the road to follow to all those who still believe in the possibility of a resurrection (resurgimento); you will [thus] constitute the initial nucleus of a big nationalistic cohort" 36 .
33) Ibidem, p. 183. 34 ) Ibid., p. 183. This was, in our view, the first position ever held publicly by a student in Brazil on the question of civic education and in favor of the "conscicntization" of the illiterate population. This was also the first student manifestation to date, and openly in favor of the free exercise of the vote.
One should note that fiercc polemics, in favour or against the military service, was registered at that time in Congress, in the Press and political clubs and meetings. The old positivists, the liberals, the federalists as well as some authoritarian-minded jurists like Alberto Torres, were strongly against, while the remnants of florianism, the adepts of the "French democracy" and, as a rule, those concerned with education at the grass-roots, were in favour. The Schools of higher learning, in Sâo Paulo and elsewhere, reflected, of necessity, this emotional split in the Brazilian intelligentsia.
36 ) "Discurso proferido pelo Dr. Frederico Vergueiro Steidel porocasiSoda Festa da Chave, em 2 de Dezembro de 1916", in: Onze de Agosto, q.v. supra, pp. 188-191. -The "errors committed" to which the professor alluded, were the misrepresentations of the Constitution of ! 891 and the abuses made by the State republican leadership in matters of electoral participation. However, this was no new criticism; it was accompanying federalism and civic education since their very first days in republican Brazil.
There is no doubt that the new ideas on national military service on one hand and on the extension of basic education to children and adults alike on the other hand were welcomed by the heads of the armed forces who long since had tried to have their own ideas on the constitution of a big army accepted by the political interests and by the public opinion of the time. In fact, Bilac and his first followers were simply asking that the armed forces should be considered not from a sentimental point of view but from a utilitarian one; the forces, in their philosophy of civic education, were meant to alternate and, in places, to continue, the work done (or rather to be done) by primary instruction.
The agitations in the Faculties and in the Press, the disputes between the partisans of one method and those of another, soon converged towards the overall acceptance of the idea that the Brazilian people had simply been forgotten by its elite 37 . Moreover, however great the distrust of many for the presence of the army among the proposed educators of the people, the barracks came to be, albeit grudgingly, considered as one more means for solving a problem which asked, even before a solution, for better analyses and better interpretations. This would lead to the desire for a better definition of the "people" itself and here, the partisans of the "pacifist" current took the lead over those supporting the military association to public education, in the sense that the former would try, first and foremost, to better the "people" from the point of view of its rights than from the point of view of the people's duties and obligations.
This idealistic approach was, however, hampered by a series of objective obstacles, among them the bad relations (physical and cultural) among the different regions of Brazil being one of the foremost. The lack of coordination suffered by all centers of public life, in various degrees, made itself felt in the frittering away of the all-Brazilian ambitious tasks which the leaders 37 ) This is a very large topic and the literature covering it is, either in Brazil or elsewhere, extensive as well. Succintly, the idea was that the Republic had been "betrayed", by the new republican leaders, who showed themselves -with few exceptions -avid, fouisseurs du pouvoir ... It started with Quintino Bocaiúva ("Isso ηΰο è a República de meus sonhos"), continued on a juridical plane with Assis Brasil, spread in the schools of higher learning (Viveiros de Castro, Esmeraldino Bandeira in Rio de Janeiro, Càndido Motta, JoSo Mendes de Almeida in SSo Paulo), in the political literature (Silvio Romero: Provocates e Debates, and A bancarrota do regime federal ; Euclidei da Cunha: Os ScrtOes) and found its journalistic expression in the years' long attacks on the regime in the "Correlo da Manhi" and belatedly, in the Inquiry of the "Estado de SSo Paulo" referred-to above. It found its military adherents among the partisans of the unitarian State: jacobins and florianists of all shades. of the Liga de Defesa Nacional had set themselves following the act of its formal constitution in 1916 38 .
As things were at the time, the main ideas of the Liga de Defesa Nacional had more chances to stand the challenge of passivity and inertia when administered under the aegis of a regional, solid economic structure, when propagated by intermediate social groups which would act as transmitting conveyor-belts between the elite and the "people".
The best example of such a regionalist reappraisal of the ideas on national unity was, without a doubt, the offspring of the Liga de Defesa Nacional which appearded in June 1917 in Säo Paulo, the Liga Nacionalista. This new League was -true to Bilac's initiatives, some twenty months earlier -a "cohort of nationalism" in a surrounding where the strong immigrant accretions had led, in time, to an upsurge of xenophobia among the natives, to corresponding unwillingness to integrate and to nostalgia for a far-awaysometimes never known -motherland, on the part of numerous immigrants and their sons 39 .
The Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo
The appearance of the Liga Nacionalista de Sao Paulo was itself a witness of the inconclusiveness of purposes and of the objective lack of organization on a nation-wide basis of the mother-League. Olavo Bilac himself had, indeed, anticipated this development when he asked the paulista academic youth to unite and act, either alone or in federation with other youth organizations, which might eventually appear in other places in Brazil.
This occurred in June 1917 when the Liga Nacionalista was officially established in Säo Paulo. From the start the new League declared its intention of going hand in hand with the Liga de Defesa Nacional but, distinguo, its program of activities was based upon the education of the "people" rah ter than upon the recruiting of a big army. It showed since its very be-38 ) The Statutes of the Liga de Defesa Nacional indicated the eventuality of its becoming in time a federation of regional (estadual) civic leagues, with its Directorate being destined to play a somewhat controlling role in civic education all over Brazil. It might have evolved into that long aspired-for, all-national party, which never materialized in old republican Brazil. ginning an evident shyness in dealing with things military, in practice more than in words. Its activities were strong in the schools of higher learning, especially at the Faculty of Law; and, on a more public plane, it was a partner of the "Estado de Säo Paulo", in nationalist propaganda in the State.
Appearing in a region heavily composed of immigrants of all kinds (foreign as well as from other regions of Brazil) the new League had to define itself vis-à-vis the ethnic and cultural peculiarities of the State of Sao Paulo. As one would see further on, the Liga Nacionalista was not prepared to act with one voice in this respect, a fact which heavily influenced the behaviour of some of its members and leaders as well.
Olavo Bilac had returned in April 1917 to Sâo Paulo, aiming this time to exhort students, professors and, as a rule, local intellectuals, to support Brazil's entry in the war against Germany. Such an event was, however, apt to provoke more than a passing eddy among the German colonists and economic interests established in Säo Paulo 40 . Moreover, the labor conditions were deteriorating at that time between employers and workers, the latter being also immigrants or second-generation immigrants in their overwhelming majority. Such differences were also apt to pose problems both of obedience and discipline towards the political-juridical structure of the time.
All these specific worries would not be solved by students alone; therefore, Bilac proposed that the new League should be formed by a movement within the ruling elite -mostly by professors and other intellecutals -with strong additions of other elite elements, to be recruited from among the well-off economic sectors of the State. The students would form rather a passive body, the basis for propagandistic actions in the public realm at large but in no way constitute a deliberative or a consultative factor.
The Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo was officially founded by a limited group comprising paulista professors, financiers and journalists. The number of the former was impressive: five, as against one capitalist and two journalists: the former were: Frederico Vergueiro Steidel, Arnaldo Vieira de Carvalho, Rodolfo Santiago, Antonio de Sampaio Dória and Reynaldo Porchat; young José Carlos de Ma'cedo Soares represented higher finance and commerce (being himself at the time the President of the powerful Säo Pau- The appearance of this paulista League corresponded, on an immediate plane, to a series of objectives stemming, as a rule, from the desire to better define the ascension and the revendications of the middle sectors. This might explain why Bilac's ideas on popular education and social redemption had to be translated in paulista terms into a platform of activities much more down-to-earth than its carioca counterpart.
Voted in May 1917, the Statutes of the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo took care, as a preamble, to declare the organization apolitical and even more -strangely enough -that: "The League is foreign to political, religious or philosophical faiths" (article I). The same article contained also the following proposals: a) To create and assure national solidarity through the preaching ... of the idea of moral and material unity between the units of the federation. b) To work for the development of primary, secondary, superior and professional education. c) To spread civic education and the cult of patriotism throughout all the social classes. d) To promote and reinvigorate the study of the problems bearing relation to the prosperity and the dignity of the country. e) To combat electoral absenteeism as well as all forms of frauds which corrupt and deform the exercise of the vote. f) To advise and facilitate the foundation of rifle-range associations (linhas de tiro), of boyscout associations and of patriotic batallions. g) To work for the good implementation of the laws concerning military training, supporting the measures bearing to national defense. h) To obtain that teaching of the national tongue and of the history of Brazil should become compulsory in all foreign schools 41 .
While the patriotic activities seemed to be common to the two Leagues there existed, since the beginning, however, a clear differentiation of purpose between the two which -this is our opinion -might also have given a clue as to their ultimate evolution.
Indeed, the reading of the speeches of Bilac and his fellow Directors of the Liga de Defesa Nacional gives reason to believe that the mother-League aspired to be an heir to the patriotic movements of 1893-1894 (especially in the formation of "popular batallions" -which would recall the famous "Benjamim Constant" and "Tiradentes" civilian armed batallions of the civil war in Rio de Janeiro); the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo contented itself only to participate in the civic educational measures and, while acknowl· edging the necessity of military training, it ignored military-civilian collaboration in the shaping of national consciousness among the youth, immigrants and "marginal" layers of society.
The Statutes of the Liga de Defesa Nacional spoke only vaguely of the participation of "marginal" sectors in public life (article e: "to combat illiteracy . . . and dissolution of mores .. ." and article f: "to develop civic consciousness . . .") while those of the Liga Nacionalista said clearly that it wanted to fight against the obstacles preventing free exercise of the vote as well as against electoral absenteeism (which was another expression of popular distrust towards the authorities comportment in such events). Also, article h of the Statutes of the Liga de Defesa Nacional said forcefully that one should stimulate military training in all types of schools, the superior ones inclusively, while article f of the Statutes of the Liga Nacionalista referred to the topic in terms as vague as possible, without specifying the necessity of training in schools, at all.
Another conspicuous difference between the two civic Leagues was the type of public to which each desired to appeal: the Liga de Defesa Nacional accepted the postulate that the elite should patronize the education of those sectors living apart from political and cultural life and, a very important consideration, it did not press too much in matters of political rights for the masses. At the same time, this League heavily borrowed from florianism (sometimes even trying to outdo florianism itself) for instance when it aimed to create regional (estadual) Directorships which, à la rigueur, might well imply a hidden tendency to consider itself a moralizing body, impressing itself upon public and authorities alike all-over Brazil.
On the other hand, the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo was regionalist, and did not aspire to any nation-wide recognition of status or preferred position.
Paradoxically enough, the leadership of the first League was generally composed of litterati, faculty professors and many reserve officers while the direction of the second League was, basically, in the hands of Sao Paulo's high finance and faculty professors. The professors were, to all intents, the elements destined to give an intellectual rationalization to the aspirations of a reformist part of Säo Paulo's elite who aimed at democratizing political processes and accelerating the integration of the immigrants. They were, almost without exception, also members of the PRP. This membership would give -quite from the very first moment -the measure of the Liga Nacionalista chiefs' attitude towards such problems as: military penetration into civic education, the behaviour towards the ascending -but still frus-trated -middle sectors and, above all, towards the education of the immigrants and "marginal" sectors (either "national" or "alien").
The Liga Nationalhta descended from "above"; it was bom "aristocratic" if one accepts the term coined by one of its young student members and, in time, one of its leaders as well, Dr. Paulo de Nogueira Filho 42 . Remembering the inaugural session of the new League, this author would affirm that the workers' plight -a pressing issue at the time -was not even touched upon by the new "nationalist" leaders: ". .. the strike 43 did not enter the thoughts of the League" 44 . The only mention of social agitation which already preceded the July strike, referred to the fact that ". .. we are starting to implement the aims of our program and will look for the worker in his centers, in order to teach him the indispensable notions for his becoming a useful citizen" 45 .
The composition of the Liga Nacionalista's leadership (not necessarily, then, its Directorate) reflected the ideas, already in fashion in Western Europe, of the role of the elite in a "regenerated society": the new leaders did not represent individuals-"history" (that is, they did not appear as descendants of "old families": pessoas de fino trato, ilustres cavalheiros, sometime quatrocentistas, even if they were so considered -or so considered themselves) as the time-honored praxis would demand in Säo Paulo and in Brazil. A novelty at the time, they appeared as individuals-"Profession". This manner of electing -and presenting to the public -a leadership, was nearer to the ideas spread long before the end of the century by the German sociologists of the Ständestaat theories or, nearer in time, to Giovanni G e η t i 1 e 's theories on the value of education through profession and not through the abstract behaviour of man.
Each member of the leadership (roughly composed of some 16-18 persons) was to be a representative of a given, well-defined professional sector 42 ) Paulo Nogueira Filho was a student leader, descendant of a wealthy family of sugar-plantation owners (his grandfather was José Paulino Nogueira); he played a leading role among radical students in Säo Paulo and, only 27 years old, became in 1926 the Secretary General of the new oppositionist party, the Partido Democrático de Säo Paulo, formed by the reformist wing of the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo.
43 ) The "strike" is the famous strike os SSo Paulo workers which paralysed the city during the month of July 1917. 44 ) Paulo Nogueira Filho: Ideáis e lutas de um burgués progressista, q. v. supra, p. of the paulista society 46 : ". . . the magistrate and the general, the jurist and the physician, the engineer and the journalist and, especially, this ardent class of students which, through teaching and through its contacts with the people will regenerate its own feelings", as Professor Frederico Vergueiro Steidel would express himself on the occasion 47 .
The activities of the Liga Nacionalista de Säö Paulo soon became orientated towards the implementation of two major-regional objectives: the extension of primary education and the "brazilianization" of the immigrants. Both activities bore the stamp of a civilian approach in matters of national education, rejecting the original idea expressed by the Liga de Defesa Nacional that the shaping of good citizens should go hand in hand with military training 48 .
At the same time, the leaders of the Liga Nacionalista were conscious of the fact that the eradication of illiteracy -either in the barracks or elsewhere -would not really offer positive results unless accompanied by the awakening of the inhabitants to the possibility of participating in public affairs.
Here, indeed, the leaders of the new League had to fight their own elitist education which strongly opposed any cooperation, in equal terms of opportunity in social life, with the non-favorized sectors. Cold reason overcame class interests in this first phase of the formation of the Paulista League, and as soon as the League was formed, its leaders would come forward with some audacious concepts on government and popular representation. They would assert bluntly that: ". . . the national will is substituted by the will of an insignificant minority which talks, votes and takes decisions. As a consequence, this abnormal situation leads to the formation of an aristocracy ... of those who know how to read and write, at the expenses of the popular necessities which, thus are lost and cancelled [because of] the incapacity of the majority to act" 49 .
They would also say that: ". . . it is conceivable that the governments of [this] country should interest themselves intensively (in the problem of illiteracy, NA) in order to prevent the national will being dictated by 35 % of the population ... ; rare are the State or districts' authorities which have dreamed to diminish analphabetism . . . Today, nationalism must consist mainly of the amplification of culture and the rise of public consciousness (espirito público). Consequently, they asked that the authorities should "institute legal norms which should awaken the national consciousness, which will see to it that all the nation appears at the polls and votes according to its own conviction; [thus,] the elections would become real consultations of the country['s will]" 50 . Armed with these desiderata, the leaders of the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo started organizing night schools for illiterate adults, to be staffed by paulista students in quest of motivation in their social purposes 51 . Parallel-wise, and despite its declared apolitism, the Liga Nacionalista did not hesitate to send a strong Representaçâo both to the National Congress and to the Paulista State Assembly, asking each of them to legislate on the institution of universal free vote in Brazil. The same Relatório cited above would say regretfully, that "our representation awoke no echo in the National Congress. The project of law, under the authorship of deputy Abelardo César (one of the members of the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo, NA) feil ... in the Chamber".
The leaders of the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo were, indeed, advancing in a correct direction (correct, in the sense of being faithful to their own ideas) when adopting the project of a big campaign destined to eradicate illiteracy among "nationals" and "aliens" alike (which implied also the teaching of the Portuguese language for the latter) and when pushing for- ward the popularization of the idea of the extension of the vote. Their insistence in this last respect thus laid the basis for a movement or protest in this direction, which had until then been utterly lacking (organizationwise) in Brazil. Shortly after the constitution of the Liga Nacionalista, a young teacher would make himself heard at the Faculty of Law of Säo Paulo, asking frontally for the creation of a full-fledged oppositionist party, of a new type, a moralizing and an educational factor in society: "The only means whereby Brazil might succeed to accomplish a political regeneration is the formation of parties, with independent persons of which there are, in this country, an high number; [these persons] are [today] wholly estranged from politics. These are forces completely lost to the actual momentum. It would be easy to form a party on the basis of such elements which are very strong in numbers, also because of its being formed of incorruptible people. Once an oppositionist party was formed, it would be difficult for the Government to go on -with the usual tricks -along the path of electoral corruption and fraud in the counting of votes, this last weapon being more dangerous than corruption, and which reveals how this country lives under a despotic yoke. Once the opposition is organized, one should [proceed to] the popularization of the Leagues or [other] associations, in order to facilitate the verification of electoral rights" 53 .
These words in favor of a new party, probably the first ever pronounced at this Faculty of Law, were enhanced still more by the young lecturer's belonging to the newly-constituted Liga Nacionalista and can be construed as an experimental balloon on the part of the leaders as to the eventual response to this idea in students and professors' circles in Säo Paulo.
The Liga Nacionalista also made some faux-pas (if we judge these steps in the immediate perspective of the ensuing twenties) which made this association run into shallow waters. One of the basic tenets of the League had been that its membership would be granted "to all native Brazilians, from the age of 16 upwards" 54 . Thus it discriminated between native Brazilians and but born abroad. This would severely limit unity and, in a heterogenous ethnic area like Säo Paulo, would hurt nationalistic feelings of many intellectuals, themselves sons of immigrants.
This limitative position was influenced at that time by strong anti-immigrant tides in the Press and in the educational system. These movements of unequal force, under the impact of the war propaganda soon began to discriminate between "good" and "bad" aliens or sons of aliens; thus, German immigrants were persecuted in the Southern States and in Säo Paulo and, after the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany, in April 1917, German schools were closed and German language teachers summarily dismissed from their jobs. Another campaign, gaining momentum among Rio de Janeiro and Säo Paulo students, was directed at the same time, albeit for different reasons, against the Portuguese, accused of hoarding and stocking food and thus contributing to the high cost of living s 5 .
Such campaigns demonstrated that cheap xenophoby was not a valuable asset in evaluating the degree of culture of a people and many a leader of the Liga Nacionalista felt the blind alley they had allowed themselves to be pushed into. A rectification of position was soon considered necessary. However, one had to wait for the end of the war to have spirits called to order -as it were -and try to quieten down ideas and expurgate clichés.
Concluent with attempts at rectification was the appeal launched in 1919 by Julio Mesquita -himself Brazilian-born son of Portuguese immigrantsto the Brazilian students to abandon their chauvinistic attitudes towards strangers and immigrants alike. Julio Mesquita -whose position in Säo Paulo had always been strong -wrote in his call to the moços académicos that Bilac's nationalist propaganda had not been meant to disrupt the in : cipient unity of the people living in Brazil ". .. since, it was from beginning to end a [movement] of solidarity and concord". He acknowledged however the lack of unity of purpose within the Brazilian intelligentsia and its lack of clarity as to the meaning of immigration, either in Säo Paulo or in Brazil in general: "We do not ignore that,for some, we should have gone even farther; there are those who regret, with a badly-placed nostalgia, the anomalous periods -happily day-by-day shorter and less tumultuous -which should [in their eyes] have become as many as normal periods in the way of living of the Brazilian people; when a patriot would have been he who hated the stranger, frankly or in secrecy; remarkably, the Portuguese was the most hated .. ."
For Julio Mesquita, .. the Nationalist member of the Liga Nationaiista is extremely nationalist but, while ardently dedicated, one should not find in him any trace of jacobinism. For the Liga Nacionalista any stranger, and especially the Portuguese, is a friend and a collaborator, as long as he does not prove by acts or words that he desires to be the contrary". In his words, without immigrants -upon whom one should not throw the blame for individual errors and excesses -"it would be very difficult if not impossible, for Brazil to realize the grandeur of its dreams" se .
Julio Mesquita was, in a way, answering the clamours against immigrants heard at the time both in the North-East (where there were few) and in Säo Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (where there were many), considered by some intellectuals as harmful to the brasilidade, as well as disseminators of "foreign ideas" aiming at subverting national unity.
As time went on, the Liga Nacionalista found itself at the head of a prosperous venture in the schools of higher learning of Säo Paulo as well as in the cultural and economic milieu of that State. While it had appeared in the Paulista landscape as a movement coming from "above", the presence of renowned professors among those who ratified its Statutes -which had, at that time, the value of a manifesto or of an oratio pro domo mea, rarely encountered in Brazil -was significant: these professors belonged, by their family ties, to a given and welldefined social type; they were associated to a type of social structure which, however, asked for modifications, and strong ones to all intents. It was those professors who, together with professional educators and journalists, would play the role of non-political agitators and who would not remain indifferent to the transformations occurring in demographics, or in the definition of the -until then -"traditional" property . Industrialization on one hand and changes in the very conception of the labor (trabalho) weighed heavily in their attitudes towards the change as such.
In a word, these "civic activists" (to call them by the name they would adopt for themselves) judged themselves able to offer at the same time a warning and a definition to the process of restratification taking place in their surroundings. This process reminded many in Sâo Paulo of a similar phenomenon taking place at the same time in the region of Buenos Aires, which had permitted, already at the turn of the century, the appearance of the Unión Cívica. The Argentinian movement, a true expression of middle sectors springing from immigration and industrialization, was already in power in Argentina by 1916. To try to apply such lessons either in Säo Paulo or in Brazil, was the temptation the leaders of the Liga Nacionalista were to face and indeed, one of their major preoccupations in the years to come.
Evidently, what with such strong moral, cultural and even economic weight behind it, this League should have transformed itself into an autonomous party or, at least, in an open and self-asserting oppositionist splinter to the perrepista establishment in Sâo Paulo. Other groups had started in history with far lesser weight of ideas. Such a group should have busied itself with at least, trying to transform the PRP from within, if not deciding to oppose it frontally from without. This, however, was not the case and the Liga Nacionalista satisfied itself with a quite curious role in the public life of Sâo Paulo: it was only a moral factor, dominating the academic life at will 57 . It was strongly represented in the educational councils of the State, imposing itself in a number of manifestations in this field as, for instance, the estadual School Census of 1920 s 8 .
The Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo was officially open (with restrictions imposed upon certain un-Brazilianized immigrants) to all the inhabitants.
57 ) The Liga Nacionalista succeeded in controlling all the student gremios in Säo Paulo and had a strong voice in the Congregations of different schools of higher learning. It also controlled the editorial staffs of the Revistas of several faculties. It made use also of the "Estado de Säo Paulo" as a valuable and respected speaker to the general public. Being "civic" and not political, its leadership might sometimes include non-PRP members, especially among the students. However, it stayed PRP up to the military insurrection of 1924 in Sâo Paulo. At the time, it was already a "summit movement surprisingly moderate, having as a base exclusively the educated bourgeoisie" 59 . Young students would soon find it an intolerant intellectual group and would begin to criticize it in the faculties, especially when big crises were felt throughout Brazil, and when the Liga Nacionalista would confront them more and more with a conservative antidemocratic bias.
To begin with, student life at the time was varied enough, after 1919, to have small groups start contesting either the presence of the Liga Nacionalista leaders or their student proxies at student reunions, or their pressures to have certain attitudes taken "in the name of the students of Sâo Paulo".
First conflicts took place as early as 1919 when, under the impact of the big epidemics of Spanish influenza in Brazil, the Federal Government decided to limit public reunions and, among other measures, granted automatic advancement to all students of Brazil from one year into a superior one, without examinations.
The Liga Nacionalista de Sâo Paulo resented this "promotion by decree" and saw in it a premium, not to sanitation but to cheap studies. It therefore asked all students and professors of Sao Paulo to be present at the examinations of the end of the academic year. The students of the first years refused to do so; those of the concluding year did indeed report for examinations, for fear of having their diplomas badly considered afterwards in Sâo Paulo's intellectual circles 60 .
Later on, in 1920, at the insistence of the Directorate of the League, student delegates were sent into the interior of Sâo Paulo in order to bolster the students' interest in military training, which was reaching a painfully low ebb. The war-time enthusiasm for military training or for tiros de guerra did not inspire the post-war generations. The campaign opened in this respect that year by the Centro XI de Agósto bore witness to the desánimo, the "indifference", the "failure (naufràgio) wo which the military service leads" 61 . The Liga Nacionalista gave instructions to student delegates to put pressure to bear upon interior students to join the army, menacing the reluctant ones "to act", to "have them punished" by the authorities 61 .
A more serious student protest against the slowing down of enthusiasm for democratic reforms on the part of the League occurred in 1921, when a new student publication, "Dyonisos", accused the organ of the Centro XI de Agósto of being edited "on monies received from the Government" 63 , an accusation which implied that, since the organ in question was, since 1917, well under the control of the League 64 , the League itself did not disassociate itself completely or partially from the PRP.
Another indication -maybe the most significant -that the Liga Nacionalista had already reached its reformist limits was the way this organization aired its reaction to the 5 th of July 1922 insurrection at the Fort of Copacabana in Rio de Janeiro. At the insistence of the League, the Centro XI de Agosto of the Faculty of Law of Sao Paulo sent a congratulatory telegram to President Epitácio Pessoa for his rapid repression of the insurrection and invited him to attend, as a guest of honor, the 11th of August functions at that Faculty 65 ,
Despite such evident political self-limitations, the League's paramountcy in Säo Paulo continued firm, helped mostly by its efficient net of schools for immigrants and by its indeniable and intertwined relations with the Congregations of professors and with the official student organizations {centros académicos) of Säo Paulo.
The Liga Nacionalista's influence in intellectual circles in Sao Paulo was at its zenith in 1924 when strong carioca student agitations, caused by the prorogation of the state of siege at the beginning of the year directly menaced the stability of student life in Säo Paulo.
As known, Brazil was ruled at that time under the state of siege, proclaimed on the day of the insurrection at the Fort of Copacabana and prorogated many times under the ensuing Presidency of Arthur Bernardes. In January 1924, the Government tried again to prevent, through the prorogation of the estado de sitio, the election of a number of oppositionist leaders in the Assembly of the State of Rio de Janeiro (and of Raúl Fernandes as 63 ) Centro XI de Agosto, without signature, in: Dyonisos, an oppositionist student publication at the SSo Paulo Faculty of Law, Säo Paulo July 1921, p. 2. col. III. Such accusations were frequent in Brazil and were met with indifference since student life in those times had always been conditioned by subservience and dependence on the good will of State leaders. We mention this episode here only for its being the first accusation since 1917 that the PRP and the Liga Nacionalista formed one indivisible interest.
64 ) AU the centros académicos of SSo Paulo accepted Liga Nacionalista guidance after June 1917. 45 ) Cf: "Homenagem ao Presidente Pessoa", in: Onze de Agosto, anno XX, Agosto de 1922, p. 4. The article invoked to this end: ". . . our nationalism, which develops in a firm manner under the enlightened orientation of the Liga Nacionalista (p. 4); it was, in perspective, the first indirect public acknowledgment in SSo Paulo of the lack of identity in the matter of goals -democracy-wise -between the young military insurgents and the leaders of the Liga Nacionalista de SSo Paulo, President of this State). The student gremios and centros at the Faculties of Medicine and Law as well as at the Poly technical School of Rio de Janeiro protested strongly against the Government's measure, threatened to strike and asked their paulista colleagues (as well as in other towns) to show their solidarity.
The paulista students' response to their carioca colleagues demand was split ; a number at the Faculty of Law reluctantly signed the protest individually. The Centro XI de Agôsto however -under pressure from the Liga Nacionalista -opposed any political action under the reason that . . the centro was the obligé of Dr. Arthur Bemardes.. ,"
66 . An oppositionist group at this Faculty, the Chave 61 , issued a call, in which it spoke, as others did in the past, of the "shameful decay visible in the ranks of the youth at the Faculty of Law of Säo Paulo, dominated presently by a group of... servile men and courtiers" 68 .
The Chave then frontally attacked the elder leaders of the Liga Nacionalista: "Is it not a nationalist manifestation to fight for the purity of the regime, a purity which does not exist without electoral truth? Is it not, perchance, a part of the League's audacious program? Or, does it (the League, NA) prefer to stay impassive .. . under the pretext of not wanting to interfere? But, it is exactly this League which, several times and without ambiguities, had expressed the will to take the direction of student opinion into its own hands: one can consider it responsible for the apathy of the students, or, to be more exact, for that of the Centro XIde Agósto" 69 .
Later on, in May 1924, as the re-election in Rio de Janeiro of populist senator Irineu Machado was cancelled by the Congress 70 , the students of Rio de Janeiro protested again and were joined by the oppositionist at the 68 ) "Juventude Decadente", q. v. supra, p. 1, col. III. 69) Ibidem, p. 1, col. III-IV. It was under the pressures of the Chave members that a number of students at this Faculty voted to solidarize with their carioca counterparts. As an answer, the Dean closed the Centro XI de Agosto in order to prevent further student reunions.
70 ) According to the 1891 Constitution, a special Commission of an outgoing (or partially outgoing) Congress -the so-called Junta Apuradora dos Mandatos -had the task of certifying the election or re-election of senators and deputies for the incoming Congress. It goes without saying that it was considered by many as a key instrument in the hands of the regime to legally invalidate the mandates of successful oppositionist politicians.
Faculty of Law of Säo Paulo. A Chave published a list of 96 students protesting the Government's actions and attacked the Liga Nacionalista again for "not having decried the partisan intervention of the Government [nor] against the despicable prorrogation of the state of siege .. " 71 .
The Liga Nacionalista and the 1924 Insurrection in Säo Paulo
These incursions in the -until then -axiomatic preponderance of the Liga Nacionalista in Paulista student life might have led, in time, to a further deterioration in its relations with the new generations of students, were it not for the shock of the 5th of July 1924 insurrection in Sao Paulo. As known, the State Força Pública and three regular federal regiments garrisoned in town rebelled that day, occupying the city for the subsequent twenty-three days. The city, abandoned by the State Government and Assembly, bombed incessantly by the legalist troops, found itself without rulers -an exceptional event in all Brazilian history before and afterwards.
The Directorate of the Liga Nacionalista -whose members had been ordered to stay in town -found itself to be the sole apparent authority on the spot, a fact which enabled it to have contacts with the rebel Command, an opportunity they used to try to impose on it some attitudes and some political decisions as well 72 .
The Liga Nacionalista was successful in blocking the rebels' first overtures to the workers 73 and succeeded to convince them afterwards to abandon the city.
This was, however, the swan song of the Liga Nacionalista. Indeed, for the first time in Brazilian history, a civic organization -having preached for eight years the benefits of the universal secret vote and the cleansing of political life -was meeting, in revolutionary conditions, a military rebel-lious group, possessed of similar ideas on the future of Brazil. The reaction of the milieu forming the Liga Nacionalista was, however, less than warm, if not expressive of complete refusal to cooperate with the rebels. It sent the rebel Command notes of protest against bombardments trying -naively, one may say -to keep the balance by sending similar protests to the federal forces outside Säo Paulo 74 .
The high-point of this hamletian episode was in a message sent by the Liga Nacionalista to the commanding rebel officer, Gen. Isidoro Días Lopes, whose text asserted that: "The Liga Nacionalista has no partisan content. Being foreign to combats and competitions of armies in campaign, it only desires to contribute, in the measure of its forces, to the reduction of the evils [of the civil population]" 75 . Consequently, the Liga Nacionalista announced that its mission was to be an institution of charity, "a center of protection and relief to the civil population of this Capital" 76 . The rationalization of these series of attitudes, which were to astonish friend and foe alike, was given later on when, as an exile in Paris, the same José Carlos de Macedo Soares stated: "Doctrinal organ for disinterested patriots, civic school for the brilliant student youth of Säo Paulo, the Liga Nacionalista is, in its aims as well as in its methods, profoundly conservative. This aspect, however, should be understood in an intelligent manner. Conservative of all that is good in Brazil. What is bad should, according to the Liga, be corrected .. ," 77 . It is evident, said the author, that during the revolutionary period, "the Liga Nacionalista did indeed honor its traditions of civism, of disinterest, of nobility (nobreza) and impartiality, etc." 78 .
The leaders of the Liga Nacioanlista de Säo Paulo were arrested as soon as the legalist troops re-entered the city. José Carlos de Macedo Soares, Julio Mesquita and several others were accused of collaboration with the rebels. The first was exiled to Europe for one year; the other, who had printed at his journal all the proclamations of the rebels -as well as those of the Liga Nacionalista -was freed later on.
The most important act on the part of the Government was, however, the closing down of the League on the 7th of August 1924 79 . Notwithstanding, two months later, as the State Government resigned, the PRP leadership made its peace with a number of former Liga Nacionalista chiefs and asked them to supply "a leader of the party in the estadual Congress, the Chief of the Police and the Commanding General of the Força Pública . . ." 80 .
Thus the Liga Nacionalista emerged, after eight years of public activities without political responsabilities, as one part -and a basic one -of the political make-up of the Administration of Sâo Paulo. It had started a rare salto-mortale in paulista politics But, as it landed, it was already dead.
The demise of the Liga Nacionalista -or, rather, lack of political firmness in the insurrection -led also to paulista student reactions, sometimes of disappointment, sometimes nervous sometimes nearing sheer panic. A thorough reading of student publications appearing at that time in Sao Paulo shows that the oncoming 11th of August functions at the Faculty of Law were conceived by the PRP -as well as by the Federal Governmentas an open stage for political rationalization both of the repression and of the Liga Nacionalista's failure to stand up to the challenge. The 11th of August functions were -conceivably enough -put under the sign of the fight against "materialism", "anarchism", "bolchevism". A direct attack on the armed forces would have been a foolish affair, the more so that the federal army -as a whole -had proved its fidelity to the Federal Government and the "republican institutions" 81 .
Students were mobilized -after having previously paraded on the streets of Sao Paulo with torches and banners in honor of the Federal Government -to hear the orators who -following the best example of the elders of the Liga Nacionalista during the insurrection -reminded the public that: "... it is a great crime to touch upon divine and material manifestations of life, for they possess their own laws; this is also a social evil", while in the same breath prasing the "just critics", the "respectful protests", "the energetic demands" etc.; they would painfully affirm that "the patriots have the duty to educate the people in order that it may choose with certainty and independence" 82 .
One of the students present, a delegate of the Centro XI de Agósto, would advance the idea that "a wave of madness shakes Old Europe ... it threatens to sweep over the American continent, with its cohorts of horrors, with the implementation of free love, with the extinction of religion, with the dissolution of nations. It is necessary to oppose the subversive tendencies with the unconquerable barrier of our institutions ... to demonstrate the fanaticism of the order, through the acceptance of conformity ," 83 .
Professor Vergueiro Steidel -as a former leader of the Liga Nacionalista -tried to maintain a balance between his well-known views of the "good army" and the recent events, suggesting in his discourse that the "Army gives form (plasma) to the national idea ... the States have the armies which they want to use. In other words, the sentiments, the beliefs, the character of the soldier are the reflex of the character, of the conviction, of the sentiments of the people" 84 . Another student found that "popular revolution was, in reality, a machination destined to cheat everybody"; in his view -and quoting a former Doyen of the Faculty, Professor Herculano de Freitas -"fanaticism is a social cancer"; "the desire for liberty erected into a system has engendered fanaticism ... the fixed idea of opposition". The student found that the whole of Brazil -government, people, institutions -was guilty of the general failure which produced the military revolution and asked that reforms should be accomplished "with order ... without excesses", and so on 85 .
However, a dissident voice was heard too, on the part of an elderly professor at this Faculty, that of Joâo Arruda, a member of the Liga Nacionalista but rather of the humanitarian periphery of this organization: "Not being a focus which extends its lights over the country, the Academy of Sâo Paulo fulfills -to be sure -its principal function which is that of teaching . . . It is, then, impossible to expect from this purely didactic establishment, any action [whatsoever].. ," 86 .
This was not a limited criticism of the Faculty's rather poor show during the revolt, it was, to all intents, also a disappointed comment on the performances of the Liga Nacionalista, whose grip over the Faculty of Law of Säo Paulo had been, for eight years, one of the tightest.
The appearance of the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo corresponded to a current of ideas on a reformed politeia already discernible at the turn of the century; it was based upon a double wish, that of enlarging -in absolute numbers -the social base of the republican regime and that of having more people involved -quality-wise -in politics. This would assure in turn an increase in the number of men of good character and a more balanced appreciation -especially abroad -of Brazil's performances on the educational and social planes.
The Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo was, upon its appearance, a fine proof of the success of these attempts to understand -always on a collective level of discussions -the growing pains of Brazil; it was also the first really-organized group which aimed at giving a clear rationalization of the currently distorted concepts of "nation", "people", "democracy", and "civil rights". It pretended, in its beginning phase, to disassociate itself from the time-honored practices which had corrupted the popular confidence in the regime and it attempted, generally with success, to implant in its immediate surroundings the idea of the impersonal, anonymous State, where good administration would be enough to maintain the elite and the general population happy each with its lot 87 .
The main merit of this League is in our eyes, that of having thrown a beacon of light over the possibilités of having that famous reforma de base of Brazil begin in the near future. The value of its aims was not lessened by the subsequent abulia which permeated some of its activities. More than the campanha civilista which had preceded it, and more even than the ulterior insurrections in 1922 at Copacabana and 1924 in Sáo Paulo, or the constitution of the PCB in 1922, this League had the merit of presenting to a welldisposed and well-thinking public the blueprints of some possibilities to free Brazilian society from immobility and apathy 88 . The paulista League sketched, for the first time in Brazil, a reformist program indicating the weak points of the social structure of the country and what were, in its mind, the priorities and the options of the moment. The indecisiveness it showed gradually after 1922, its refusal to go all the way towards the fulfilment of its own political credo, point together to a number of psychological limitations, going from political naïveté to sheer cowardness in the face of the revolution's challenge. This prevented the Liga Nacionalista -which wanted to be both officiating priest and critic of morals, both an educator and a militant -from assuming its duties and accepting the realities and by so doing to transform itself into a full-fledged party. One may imagine what might have been the consequences for Brazil of this unique encounter between revolutionary -but unsophisticated military -and the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo, but for the last-minute trahison des clercs . ..
As time went rapidly onwards, the radical intellectual trends within the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo transferred -on an individual plane -to a new civic organization which -unique in Brazil -tried to mobilize students and young graduates only. This new organization -a group rather than a party -was the so-called Partido da Mocidade, a true expression of the younger intellectual generations in Säo Paulo, a generation dissatisfied both with the ambiguous goals of the elders and with the objective slovenliness with which these leaders were understanding the lines of evolution of contemporary Brazil.
This organization deserves, surely, a treatment apart which we propose, indeed, to do at some later stage.
Let us only state, for the time being, that the unglorious death of the Liga Nacionalista de Säo Paulo as a constituted organization did not also mean the political death of its leaders, quite the contrary, for nothing, especially political demise, is absolute in Brazilian politics. 
